Restoring Thailand's Tourism Destination Image in the Wake of the Recent Political Crises: A few Proposals by Barnes, John
  
3 
RESTORING THAILAND’S TOURISM DESTINATION IMAGE IN THE WAKE OF  
THE RECENT POLITICAL CRISES: A FEW PROPOSALS 
John Barnes1 
 
Abstract 
As is now well understood, the tourism industry is in a crisis as the result of successive political 
uncertainty and associated violence. Compounding that issue are external crises, such as the global 
economic meltdown and H1N1 virus (Swine flu) which followed earlier crises of Avian Flu, and mad 
cow disease. To deal with such calamities, tourism planning and crisis management methodology 
have been developed but less effectively applied. This is the case with Thailand that has recently been 
badly affected by negative and sometimes less-than-accurate reports in the popular press and 
international media on its political crises: crises or disasters? This is a fine delineation but as this 
paper shows, a distinction between disasters and crises needs to be made as these words are often 
used interchangeably when in-fact they are unique. This paper further argues adoption of DESTCON; 
a scale for classifying crises and disasters. To this end, it proposes adoption of DESTCON as a 
recognized ranking scale for crises. If media, embassies, and all tourism authorities adopted this 
scale to accurately inform tourists of the nature and severity of conditions at the site of crises, much 
of the spin would be removed and much less damage done by sensationalizing the news. This paper 
concludes with a number of suggestions to more effectively overcome the effects of the current crisis 
and urges interested parties to continue the discussion and debate.  
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Introduction 
To simply state that the December 2008 and 
April 2009 political crises have dealt a blow on 
Thailand’s tourism destination image would 
sound like an understatement given the 
magnitude of the post-crisis damages inflicted 
upon the country. How much damage has been 
inflicted? With only six weeks having elapsed 
since the most recent crisis erupted, it is too 
early to quantify their actual current impact. 
However, if history is a guide, revisiting the 
statistics on an earlier political crisis; that of 
May 1992, will help to put the few figures 
available on the recent crises into perspective.  
Suraphol Sritrakul, the President of the Thai 
Travel Agents recently reported that “the number 
of foreign visitors had fallen 31 percent in the 
first four months of the year,” further adding: 
“But all major markets including Japan, China, 
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the United Kingdom, South Korea and Russia 
have seen falls between 23 and 40 percent.” 
(Sritama, 2009,1) In May 1992, the Thai Hotels 
Association had estimated that the average 
occupancy rate among its member hotels in 
Bangkok, Phuket, and Chiengmai was between 
30 and 35 percent, compared to the normal low 
season level of 50 to 55 percent (Asia Travel 
Trade, 1992, pp 8-9). The similarity of the 
figures lends credence to the latest statistics; all 
the more as a drop in international arrivals of 30 
percent year-to-date has also been reported 
(Sritama, 2009). Furthermore, on a recent visit to 
Pattaya, this writer drove around the city at night 
and noticed that most night spots were deserted. 
The hotel where we stayed had less than 100 
guests for a hotel with 870 rooms. Clearly, 
Thailand’s tourism image has been severely 
impacted and the tourism sector materially 
damaged across the board with airlines, hotels, 
shopping and transportation equally affected. 
And, adding insult to injury, it is all taking place 
in the midst of a severe global economic crisis 
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already adversely affecting Thai tourism and 
growing concerns over the H1N1 virus. 
In light of all these figures, the temptation is 
therefore almost irresistible for this author to 
refer to these crises as disasters. Yet, although 
using such a term to describe the aftermath of 
the political upheavals would be fitting and not 
sound hyperbolic, it would, by the same token 
raise semantics issues. Indeed, the terms ‘crisis’ 
and ‘disaster’ should not be used 
interchangeably as, in the context of tourism, 
their implications differ. As a matter of fact, it is 
particularly critical to distinguish them when it 
comes to assessing the severity of a 
crisis/disaster and managing it. 
After elaborating on this distinction in part 
one, this paper will focus on crisis/disaster 
management planning. Endorsing some of the 
findings articulated in Beirman’s Restoring 
Tourism Destinations in Crisis (2003) and Laws’, 
Prideaux’ and Chon’s, (eds.) Crisis Management 
in Tourism (2007), part two will thus consider 
some of the most salient characteristics of crisis 
management planning. Part three will then 
propose a method for assessing the level of 
severity of a crisis. 
The two most recent political crises are only 
the latest in a series of crises and disasters that 
have caused a down-turn in Thailand’s tourism 
sector. This paper will then look at recent 
developments in Thailand with a view to 
exploring how a disaster can precipitate a crisis 
and vice-versa. Finally, given the persistent 
deterioration of Thailand’s tourism destination 
image, it will consider a range of possible 
solutions to restore it. In addition to Beirman’s 
and Laws’, Prideaux’ and Chon’s publications 
mentioned above as sources for proposed 
solutions to the current woes in tourism, Hall’s 
Tourism and Politics (1994) and Glaesser’s 
Crisis Management in the Tourism Industry 
(2003 and 2006) were also tapped. 
 
1. Crises versus Disasters  
Firstly, even though the popular press 
frequently uses the terms ‘crisis’ and ‘disaster’ 
interchangeably, it is necessary to distinguish 
between them as, in the context of tourism, their 
connotations differ. 
The word ‘crisis’, which derives from the 
Latin word decision, itself borrowed from the 
Greek word krisis, comes from krinein, to decide. 
As its Latin and Greek roots unequivocally show, 
deciding about something or someone is clearly 
at its core, either as a triggering event or as a 
way of resolving it or both.  
Defining a crisis as “a crucial stage or turning 
point, especially in sequence of events or a 
disease,” the Collins English Dictionary and 
Thesaurus further suggest that any such decision 
is to be made at a “crucial stage or turning point” 
(Sinclair, 2000). Moreover, by referring to it as 
“an unstable period especially one of extreme 
trouble or danger” (Ibid.), the Thesaurus adds 
the notion of danger and instability to that of a 
critical decisional time (Sinclair, 2000). 
Two more quotes will further fine tune the 
definition in the context of tourism: crises are 
“periods of great uncertainty in which 
predictability and control are lost or severely 
diminished” (Moreira, 2007 p. 52). They are also 
“the possible but unexpected result of 
management failures that are concerned with the 
future course of events set in motion by human 
action or inaction, precipitating the events. These 
low probability and high impact situations (Weik, 
1988; Pearson and Clair, 1998) are associated 
with critical changes and threats of destruction 
(Glaesser, 2003)” (as cited in (Moreira, Ibid.). 
Of particular relevance to this paper is the latter 
notion of management failure, a reference to 
management crisis, which we will explore 
subsequently, and to the fact that a crisis is a 
situation in which there is a dominance of the 
internal origin of the initial events. 
A disaster, on the other hand, whose name 
derives from the Greek astro, a star, is defined in 
the Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus, as 
“an occurrence that causes great distress or 
destruction” (Sinclair, 2000) and as a situation 
where an external and unpredictable catastrophic 
change is associated with a low degree over the 
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evolution of events.” In short, whereas the origin 
of a crisis is predominantly internal, that of a 
disaster is essentially external. 
The fact is that in both cases, the final 
consequences depend on the pre-crisis or pre-
disaster vulnerabilities (Moreira, 2007 p.53). In 
the end, it all comes down to the level of 
awareness and preparedness of the destination. 
The less prepared a destination, the more 
vulnerable it will be to a crisis or a disaster, 
hence the need for crisis management.  
Table 1 below summarizes these various 
differentiating considerations. 
 
Table 1: Crises versus Disasters:  
Differentiating Criteria 
 
Source: Moriera, Pedro, 2007 Aftermath of Crises and 
Disasters: Notes of An Impact Assessment Approach, in 
Laws Eric, Bruce Prideaux and Kaye Chon, 2007.Crisis 
Management in Tourism CABI Publishing p.53. 
 
Having thus distinguished crises and 
disasters, it remains to see how a crisis or a 
disaster can be best handled either at the 
national or community level. 
 
2. Crisis Management Planning 
It should be noted first that whilst some 
governments prepare for crises and disasters, 
others do not. Crises can thus be allowed to run 
their own courses (management by doing 
nothing) where resources such as medicine, 
health-care services, money, skilled people or 
equipment are scarce or locally unavailable. 
When people have to fend for themselves, delay 
in overcoming the crisis will extend and the 
recovery time and increase the cost and may 
result in a crisis becoming a disaster. Moreover, 
during the extended recovery time, business as 
usual is impractical, adding an opportunity cost 
to the immediate loss. A recent tragic event in 
Myanmar, the early 2008 huge tidal surge in the 
wake of cyclone Nargis, provides a compelling 
case in point: Even though this Act of God 
wreaked havoc on many areas and caused heavy 
human losses, the government of Myanmar left 
its citizens to largely fend for themselves and, 
more regrettably, blocked international aid 
efforts to bring relief to its citizens (USAID, 
2009; Broman, 2009). 
Some government and private-sector 
organizations however, have begun to adopt a 
proactive approach to crisis management, i.e. 
they have started to anticipate both disasters and 
crises, prepare detection and warning systems, 
and establish recovery action-plans. They have 
also sequestered and mobilized resources so as 
to be in a position to manage disasters and crises 
when they occur. In short, they have engaged in 
crisis management.  
It goes without saying that crisis management 
requires planning. Still, whether as a 
consequence of ignorance, internal resistance, 
community-based conflicts, and/or cost 
(Quarantelli, 1998) or political will (Hall, 1994),  
 
it appears that many tourist destinations have 
failed to establish an adequate level of disaster 
and crisis planning (De Jong, 2003). In such 
Differentiating 
Criteria 
Crises Disasters 
Dominant 
origin of the 
initial events. 
Internal External 
Frequency of 
occurrence  
Higher Lower 
Events Time 
Line 
Prolonged Brief 
Forecast 
Potential 
Higher Lower 
Degree of 
Control over the 
evolution of the 
events 
Higher Lower 
Reaction Time 
Frame 
Preceded by 
a period that 
allows 
decision and 
action 
Immediately 
before or 
only after the 
initial events 
Impacts and 
Consequences  
Lower Higher 
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destinations, most authorities and relevant 
stakeholders continue to lack crisis/disaster 
management capabilities, flexibility and 
confidence to deal effectively with unexpected, 
complex and critical situations (Faulkner, 2001, 
Santana, 2003). And, even in cases where some 
organizations may have put formal crisis 
management plans into place, the level of 
preparedness often still remains insufficient; 
such plans being generally reactive and designed 
to address limited professional objectives, rather 
than incorporating the priorities of the wider 
community.  
The most recent political crisis in Thailand, 
which will be subsequently considered at length, 
fits into this category. Only after the crisis, were 
the police shown undergoing advanced crowd 
control techniques, as employed abroad and 
viewable in any TV street protest coverage such 
as, for example, the London street protests 
during the recent prime ministerial meetings in 
the wake of the U.S.-led financial crisis. 
Experience suggests that publicized images of 
incompetence, negligence, instability and 
inefficiency in times of adversity, can exacerbate 
and/or prolong crisis conditions (Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Centre, 2001). Thus, preparedness 
will not only minimize human and material 
losses, it will also go a long way in limiting 
potential public relations damages.  
There are, of course, countries whose 
governments are well prepared for crisis or 
disasters. This is, for example, the case of Japan 
where preparedness to the irregular occurrence 
of earthquakes is monitored by various 
departments of the Japanese government that 
ensures that citizens of all ages and 
organizations are thoroughly prepared for these 
disasters. To that end, disaster plans are 
regularly practiced so that when a disaster occurs, 
every citizen will know instinctively how to 
respond and recovery time will be minimized, 
reducing thereby the likelihood of an ensuing 
crisis.  
Another such example, one closer to home, is 
 
 that of Phuket where, two years after the 
tsunami had hit the island, an evacuation drill 
simulating that required of a tsunami was held. 
No preparedness drills, however, have since 
been publicized probably for fear of alarming 
tourists. In Phuket, as in some other tourist 
destinations, regular drills have proven to be 
successful in reducing the impact of disasters 
and mitigating ensuing crises. This is 
particularly true in the case of massive and 
devastating earthquakes such as that which 
occurred in Kobe on 17th January 1995 (Science 
Daily, 2005).  
Basing his findings on the widely-
acknowledged work by Fink 1986, (p.20), 
Keown-McMullan, 1997, (p.9) and Weiner and 
Kahn, 1972, (p.21) and further refining their 
crisis management theory, Faulkner (2001) 
identified the following key crisis management 
characteristics:  
1. A triggering event, which is so 
significant that it challenges the existing 
structure, routine operations or survival of the 
organization. 
2. The situation becomes characterized by 
fluid, unstable, dynamic situations (Fink 1986 
p.20). 
3. The managerial environment is one of 
high threat, short decision time and includes 
elements of surprise and urgency. 
4. There is an element of inability to cope 
among those directly affected. 
5. A turning point when decisive changes, 
which may have both positive and negative 
connotations, are imminent (in Laws, Prideaux 
and Chon, 2007, p.9). 
In this list, two of the six elements of the 
Political, Economic, Sociological, Technological, 
Legal and Environmental model (PESTLE), a 
model often used in Strategic Management 
(Thompson and Strickand, 1999), have been 
identified by this author, namely, political and 
economic factors. The PESTLE or PEST model  
is particularly useful to managers in 
organizations seeking to identify solutions to 
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complex problems through identifying the 
multiple factors at play in a given situation and 
where resources fall short of requirements to 
address the problem at hand. 
Concomitant to the problem of the level of 
preparedness of a tourist destination to a 
crisis/disaster is that of its level of severity. 
Raising this issue begs the question of how to 
assess the level of severity of a crisis/disaster, 
which, in turn, begs that of its relevance. We will 
first address the assessment issue and propose a 
scale before expounding on its usefulness.  
 
3. Assessing the Level of Severity of a Crisis: 
DESTCON a Proposed Five-point Scale 
When misfortune descends upon a tourist 
destination – or any area hit, for that matter - the 
very first step is to accurately classify it, as 
either a disaster or a crisis. Such a classification 
has to be based on mutually-acceptable criteria 
and requires that all communication then clearly 
abide by that classification unless there is a 
change in the nature of the issue. This will 
necessitate both consensus and responsible 
reporting on a wide scale by all media 
participants.  
Classifying an event as a crisis or a disaster, 
while necessary as a first step, will not, however, 
in and of itself provide any information as to its 
level of severity. Quantifying the severity of the 
crisis or disaster identified should thus be the 
second step. The greater the scale and scope of a 
crisis or disaster, the greater the resources 
needed to overcome the impacts; hence, the need 
to know its magnitude. Currently, however, the 
tourism industry lacks a scale on which to rank 
crises. Which criteria should then be applied?  
In the absence of any standardized, globally-
accepted means of measurement, it has been 
suggested that the tourism industry adapt to 
tourism crises/ disasters the five-point scale used 
as a basis by the global armed forces to rate the 
status of military readiness in times of threat to a 
nation’s security (Beirman 2003, p.19). Known 
as Defense Readiness Conditions, (DEFCON), 
this scale could then be renamed, as Beirman 
suggests, the Destination Confidence Scale 
(DESTCON) and applied to both crises and 
disasters (Ibid, p.19).  
The DEFCON scale is based on five points, 
ranging from 1 to 5, and ascending from 
DEFCON 5 (normal peacetime readiness) up to 
DEFCON 1 (maximum force readiness). A 
comparable scale is relevant to identifying the 
status of a destination condition. The DESTCON 
scale would be as follows (Table 2): 
 
Table 2 – DESTCON Five-point Scale 
 
DESTCON 5 Normal marketing conditions. 
DESTCON 4 Normal increased intelligence and 
strengthened marketing measures.
DESTCON 3 Increase in marketing readiness, 
above normal readiness. 
DESTCON 2 Further increase in marketing 
readiness, less than maximum 
readiness. 
DESTCON 1 Maximum crisis marketing 
readiness. 
Source: Moriera, Pedro, 2007 Aftermath of Crises and 
Disasters: Notes of An Impact Assessment Approach, in 
Laws Eric, Bruce Prideaux and Kaye Chon, 2007.Crisis 
Management in Tourism CABI Publishing p.5. 
 
Each scale level would indicate that the 
following destination conditions are met: 
- DESTCON 5: Minimal perceived threat 
to the marketability of the destination. 
- DESTCON 4: Isolated problems within 
the destination: for example, crimes, low level 
political disturbances that may require avoidance 
of specific areas but have minimal impact on the 
overall marketability of the destination. Africa 
could be a case in point. Another might have 
been the recent April 2009 political incidents in 
Bangkok. As will be discussed subsequently 
(section 4, supra), the latter, however, also meets 
some critical DESTCON 3 conditions.   
- DESTCON 3: There are major problems 
with identifiable regions in the destination. 
These problems are well publicized and present 
a credible threat to tourists in those areas. 
Threat/s includes major crime event/s, outbreaks 
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of terrorism, a localized natural disaster or an 
epidemic. Major problems in a neighboring 
destination may impact on the marketability of 
the major destination. The series of political 
coups in Fiji might fall within this category. 
- DESTCON 2: A crisis of this magnitude 
places large parts of the country at/or under 
imminent threat of war or destruction from a 
natural disaster. This stage includes wide spread 
terrorism, natural disasters, diseases or 
widespread disorders in which the safety of 
tourists is under measurable threat. As a result, 
the governments of source markets will caution 
heightened levels of concern or insist on 
complete avoidance. Recent examples of 
destinations in this category include Croatia, 
Egypt, and Sri Lanka when the crises wherein 
were at their worst. 
- DESTCON 1: A crisis of this magnitude 
not only threatens the marketability of the 
destination but also has widespread global or 
regional repercussions on tourism. In most 
instances, this involves a major act of war or 
terrorism, which draws in many nations. The 
September 11, 2001 attack on New York City 
and Washington D.C. most closely corresponds 
to this level of crisis. The crisis in New York 
triggered crises in other countries heavily reliant 
on US tourism and trade (Beirman 2003, pp.19-
20). 
It is suggested that all crises and disasters can 
be accommodated by the DESTCON scale. It is 
also recommended that to remove the media 
hype and deliver a trusted assessment of the 
situation, this scale ought to become a 
commonly-accepted global standard. Its 
application, however, may lead to perverted 
results.  
There could be some instances, in which a 
crisis situation would exist according to either 
one of the definitions outlined above yet the 
government at the site of the crisis may well 
downplay the level of severity by muting the 
response. And, as a consequence, little attention 
may be drawn to the situation as a crisis.  
National governments through their 
embassies generally attempt to overcome this by 
releasing travel advisories to their nationals not 
to travel to destinations experiencing crisis. The 
popular press also publicize those advisories, 
however, they rarely publicize when those 
advisories are lifted. One such example of 
downplaying a crisis is South Africa and its 
dealing with its crime rate. Although South 
Africa’s tourism authorities cannot be said to 
ignore the serious crime rate in the country given 
its magnitude, they treat it, however, more as an 
avoidable tourist hazard than as a crisis, thus 
diffusing crime as a threat to the viability and 
appeal of the destination. Clearly, this is not the 
way a responsible government should treat its 
citizens or visitors from abroad (Beirman, p.24). 
The recent complaints by members of the 
Egyptian Football team, who were robbed 
following their Confederations Cup Win over 
Italy, reinforce this perception as two South 
African Sunday Newspapers downplayed the 
story, quoting police sources who alleged that 
the players had befallen foul of light-fingered 
female consorts at an impromptu victory party 
(Hurd, 2009) 
Another obstacle, apart from the absence of 
an agreed scale for assessing disasters or crises, 
is the level of media exposure and its impact on 
how to qualify an event. Media attention will 
indeed influence the distinction between a tourist 
hazard and a crisis, and even the DESTCON 
rating. The level of exposure may not be related 
to the severity of the crisis or disaster but be 
more related to political sensitivities (Hall, 1994). 
“For instance, with the international media 
intensively covering the United States, Britain 
and the Middle East, events in those areas are 
often subject to intense coverage and wide 
spread media dissemination. Terrorist attacks in 
Israel are one such example. Conversely, there 
was, until recently, relatively little international 
media attention given to terrorists in Sri Lanka  
unless it occurred in or near the capital, 
Colombo, or impacted directly on tourists and  
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foreign nations” (Beirman 2003, p.21).  
However, with the Sri Lankan army making a 
final push to conquer the rebel Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Elam (LTTE) forces, as this paper is 
being prepared, the region has finally captured 
the attention of the world’s media. This is due in 
no small part to the hundreds of civilians who 
have lost their lives and the many more who 
have been wounded whilst tens of thousands 
have been displaced from their homes. In short, 
the scale of this crisis and the level of casualties 
are now such that it is bound to receive global 
media exposure.  
A major factor determining the shifting status 
of a problem from a background hazard to a 
crisis impacting on international tourism is the 
international political impact of the issue. When 
terrorism in Turkey, Sri Lanka, or the 
Philippines is restricted to an isolated localized 
crisis, far away from major cities and tourist 
centres, it is largely ignored internationally. 
However, when terrorist attacks target foreign 
tourist infrastructures, then the matter becomes 
an international incident. (Freyer and Schroder, 
2004 in Beirman, 2004) 
In light of all these considerations, this 
researcher strongly recommends that the World 
Tourism Organization (WTO) promote adoption 
of the DESTCON Scale (Table 2, supra) by 
national governments and regional and national 
tourism authorities to better inform tourists of 
likely crises, so that fully informed decisions as 
to whether or not to depart or embark on a 
journey can be made from an informed and 
ethical perspective, rather than just from a profit-
based perspective.  
 
4. Can a Disaster Precipitate a Crisis and Vice-
versa? 
Having distinguished, compared and 
contrasted both crises and disasters, one might 
consider at this juncture whether, a disaster may 
lead to a crisis and vice versa. Take Thailand, as 
a case in point. It is a fact that some disasters 
originating outside of Thailand have led to crises 
in Thailand (Litvin and Crotts, 2007). One such 
disaster that instantly comes to mind is the 
December 26, 2005 tsunami; a case where a sub-
sea volcanic eruption in the Indian Ocean close 
to Indonesia, caused a Tsunami which impacted 
Thailand and several other South East Asian 
nations. There was no tsunami early warning 
system in South East Asia at that time and 
although the tsunami was detected by the Pacific 
Ocean Tsunami Warning System Monitoring 
Station in Hawaii, there was no formal 
communication and warning system in place in 
South East Asia to alert those about to be 
affected. The fact that it occurred on the Boxing 
Day public holiday also exacerbated the 
communication problem as most people were 
sleeping off their Christmas festivities.  
One person who immediately became aware 
of the impending tsunami was John Gray, a long 
term resident of Phuket. However, he was 
largely unsuccessful in making the local 
authorities aware of the impending disaster and 
resorted to a lone approach to alerting friends 
and urging them to escape to higher ground.  
Soon after, however, the Thai Government, 
realizing the severe economic impact to 
Thailand’s destination image and tourism 
industry quickly established a tsunami local 
detection and warning system. Two years later, 
in 2007, an integrated tsunami warning system 
was developed and deployed for the Indian 
Ocean region funded by South East Asian 
governments (Rice, 2005). During that time the 
initial impact of the Tsunami disaster played out 
to a crisis for the Phuket tourism industry. 
(Semone, 2007, Campiranon and Scott, 2007 and 
Cooper and Erfurt, 2007)  
The tsunami was devastating and dealt a 
significant blow to the tourism sector in the six 
Thai coastal provinces affected. The high 
number of western tourists who were victims 
was largely profiled in the international media. 
At the same time, media discussion highlighted 
the widespread recognition of the importance of 
tourism for the local Thai economies and for 
improving the welfare of the local people. As a 
result, the importance of tourists returning to the 
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local region was emphasized and tourism 
promoted both internationally and domestically 
to minimize the crisis resulting from the initial 
disaster as defined earlier in this paper (see page 
1) (Rice, 2005). 
The Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) 
anticipated losses of 4 million Baht per month 
across the six affected provinces (The Bangkok 
Post, 2005). This loss was expected to adversely 
impact the overall economic growth of Thailand 
to the extent that the economic growth forecast 
for 2005 was cut from 3.6 percent to 5.6 percent. 
Apart from the community costs associated with 
the loss of life and the scale of the human 
tragedy caused by the enormous natural disaster, 
the business community perceived that the 
impact would only be a short-term adversity in 
certain sectors. Moreover, there was a general 
feeling that economic growth in Thailand would 
unlikely to be affected beyond one year (Ibid.). 
With this feeling of confidence participants set 
about re-establishing their businesses. The 
government pledged and delivered vital aid and 
through diplomatic channels arranged for past 
U.S. presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush 
(senior) to visit the region to encourage locals 
and attract charitable donations from abroad. 
With the diversity of local and external 
problems repeatedly impacting upon the 
performance of the tourism sector, it became 
increasingly apparent that both the Thai 
government and international and local business 
investors needed to apply more sustainable 
development strategies for managing the risk of 
disasters and crises (Hall, 1994).  
The recent political unrest in Bangkok also 
provides compelling examples of how, 
conversely, a crisis can precipitate a disaster.  
    A few months after Prime Minister (PM) 
Samak   Sundaravej had been forced to resign 
(on September 12, 2008) and replaced by Khun 
Somchai Wongsawat, the People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD), so-called “Yellow Shirts,” 
(Montlake, 2009) occupied the main Bangkok 
International Airport ((Suvarnabhumi 
International Airport), in an effort to bring an 
end to his tenure as PM.  The airport was closed 
for nine days and the occupation ended when 
PM Somchai stepped down on December 2, 
2008 after the Thai Supreme Court declared the 
previous election to have been tainted by vote 
buying (Taylor, 2009, Makinnon, 2008). Air 
traffic resumed within 2-3 days after the 
protesters left.  
In the meantime stranded passengers were 
offered departing flights out of Sattahip (a 
disused Air Force base) about 140 miles from 
Bangkok. Tourists in other parts of Thailand 
who could delay their departure were offered 
free hotel accommodation and meals for an 
extended stay (http://www.ctva.ca). 
A new coalition government was formed in 
the ensuing weeks and Khun Abhisit Vejajiva 
(Khun Abhisit), appointed PM.  Not long after, 
the opposition United Front for Democracy 
against Dictatorship (UDD), so-called “Red 
Shirts,” (Montlake, 2009), took to the streets to 
force PM Khun Abhisit to resign. On April 11, 
2009, the hotel where an ASEAN Prime 
Ministerial Meeting was scheduled to be held, 
located 135 miles east of Bangkok, was overrun 
by a small number of Red Shirt protesters, 
leading to the cancellation of the meeting and 
evacuation of the visiting Prime Ministers by 
helicopters.  
Some Red Shirt protesters also overran the 
Interior Ministry and nearby areas in Bangkok. 
As violence escalated, PM Abhisit called on the 
army to restore order and within 48 hours order 
was restored. 
As mentioned in the introduction, these 
events have dealt a blow on the Thai tourism 
industry across the board, a sector already hard 
hit by the global financial crisis and the H1N1 
virus, forcing the TAT and the industry to come 
up with coping strategies.  
 With only seven weeks having elapsed since 
the most recent incidents took place, it is too 
early, however, to determine how the Thai 
tourism industry will respond apart from some 
quick short-term fix that such as offering 
promotional hotel rates to international regional 
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or local tourists. Several hotels that had earlier 
had loyalty programs but had discontinued them 
during prosperous times have since restored 
them to boost local tourist participation. And 
should occupancy rates remain low, more 
discounts and incentives are to be expected. 
How do the political crises rank on the 
DESTCON scale? Revisiting Beirman’s (2003) 
edited volume, which considers various political, 
natural and humanitarian crises and disasters and 
rate them, will help to map out an answer.  
Part II of the book contains five chapters, 
each being a case-study of a particular terrorist 
or politically violent act. Each is set in a 
particular country and each case describes the 
incident and suggests a DESTCON ranking and 
discusses what actions were taken to overcome 
the particular tourist crisis. Two political coups 
in Fiji in 1987 and 2000 were described to 
illustrate how DESTCON apply and a ranking of 
3 assigned. 
Part III describes a series of cases involving 
natural disasters and a DESTCON ranking was 
assigned (DESTCON 2) and how they were 
addressed from a tourism perspective. 
Part IV describes cases of epidemics -
appropriate now as we are under attack by H1N1 
virus (DESTCON 2), whilst parts V and VI, 
cover crime and the war on terrorism 
respectively, with both ranked as DESTCON 1.  
Clearly, the recent political agitation in 
Bangkok ranks as DESTCON 3. Both crises 
were major problems in identifiable areas. And 
the April 2009 agitation was a credible threat to 
tourists in the small parts of Bangkok where 
violence had spread. Though there was no 
physical intimidation per se during the 
December 2008 airport occupation, commotion 
between the two factions involved in the stand-
off could have erupted at any time. The potential 
for health hazards was also high. And the risk of 
seeing violence escalate and spread to other parts 
of the city was there as well. In addition these 
events were highly publicized, domestically and 
abroad – and in some cases over-reported. But 
most importantly, given the large number of 
tourists stranded all over the country - and at the 
airport itself, in an undoubtedly much less 
comfortable environment – and, in spite of the 
government’s endeavors to mitigate damages, 
both events seriously impacted on the 
marketability of Thailand as a major tourist 
destination: hence, its current woes and its 
efforts to reestablish itself as a highly desirable, 
predictable, and safe heaven.  
As mentioned earlier (section 3, infra), on the 
surface, it appears as if the December 2008 and 
April 2009 events should be ranked as 
DESTCON 4 situations, characterized among 
others by isolated problems within the 
destination, such as low level political 
disturbances, that may require avoidance of 
specific areas. However, while the issue of 
whether or not the unrest should be considered 
‘low level disturbances’ arguably remains 
debatable, the substantial drop in the number of 
tourists visiting Thailand, well-below average 
occupancy rate in most hotels, and large 
discounts offered in many places clearly indicate 
that the impact on the overall marketability of 
Thailand is hardly minimal, a DESTCON 4 
factor, but on the contrary quite substantial. In 
short, since Thailand’s image and its ability to 
market itself as a tourism destination of choice 
have been hurt, the crises cannot be ranked as 
DESTCON 4 situations. 
What can ‘the land of smiles’ can do to regain 
its international standing as a prime destination? 
Another reliable way to identify the various 
options available, in addition to those already 
considered in this paper, is to review how other 
countries, facing similar crises, responded to 
similar situations and analyze their responses in 
the Thai context. 
 
5. Possible Actions to Boost Thai Tourism  
Twelve major feasible initiatives have been 
identified: 
1. Implement a number of tourism 
development areas as a mechanism for 
encouraging investments: - Thailand has been 
encouraging investments in hotel construction 
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for the past several years. The development of a 
large scale casino complex (such as has recently 
been undertaken in Singapore) would be an 
option but successive Thai governments have 
shied away from this as it competes with the 
State Lottery and is contrary to Buddhist 
principles of not encouraging gambling. 
2. Adopt a pro-active approach to securing 
additional investments in hotels and resorts 
outside of Thailand: - Thai investors could 
partner with owners in the Middle-East or with 
near neighbours in Myanmar, Kampuchea, Lao 
and Vietnam. This could augur well for the 
future and reduce exposure to the purely Thai 
location. A current research project recommends 
cross-border self drive tourism, whilst the Royal 
Thai Government has launched proposal for 
several cross-border rail links. Earlier The Dusit 
Thani Hotel group had a number of overseas 
properties however these were sold during the 
Thai Economic crisis of 1996 (Pavida, 2004, 
p.21). 
3. Initiate investment in neighboring 
countries to rehabilitate hotels which are in dire 
need of up- grading to the latest standards: - 
Many years ago, The Railway Hotel in Hua Hin 
was fully renovated and sold by The Royal Thai 
Railways department to The Central Pattana 
Group- a private Thai business group heavily 
involved in retailing and property development. 
The renovation retained turn-of-the-century 
(1900’s) décor and remains a draw-card for both 
local and international visitors. This approach 
could be repeated in neighboring countries by 
Thai investors. 
4. Simplify investment procedures for 
domestic and international investors and abolish 
withholding tax: - Thailand has followed this 
route through the Thai Board of Investment, but 
it is suggested that these be reviewed again. 
Procedures can always be streamlined. 
5. Increase the TAT staffing, budget and 
scope: - The TAT, being part of the Government 
bureaucracy is very set in its ways and needs to 
transform itself and be bench-marked against the 
best in the world. 
6. Increase the budget of The Thai Visitors 
Bureau: - Funding methods need to be reviewed 
and the most effective chosen for prompt 
implementation.  
7. Encourage closer linkages between the 
Pacific Area Travel Organization and the TAT to 
broaden the ASEAN basis of Tourism in 
Thailand: – Our near neighbors are accustomed 
to Thailand having coups and political change 
and less likely to stop traveling here than are 
overseas visitors.  
8. Prepare World Heritage Sites within the 
Kingdom better: - Thailand already has six 
World Heritage sites (UNESCO, 2009). 
However, the country does not appear to 
promote them well. A lot could be learnt and 
applied from Countries such as Italy, France, 
U.K., Egypt, and Israel. A new heritage tourism 
package could be developed either solely in 
Thailand or inclusive of sites in neighbouring 
countries (a sensitive subject when one recalls 
the recent political problems between Thailand 
and Kampuchea over the Kao Preah-Vihear 
World Heritage temple site (Real Cambodia, 
2009). 
9. Legislate and enforce minimum 
standards for the diving industry and regulate the 
operation of duty free stores: - The latter has 
already been completed here through a tender 
process. The former would however benefit from 
scrutiny and possible review as irregularities and 
corruption of the principal Duty Free appointee 
King Power was uncovered and prosecuted at 
the Suvarnabhumi International Airport during 
2008 (The Nation, 2007). 
10.  Broaden the vocational base of the Thai 
tourism educational system: - To coin the 
vernacular of a distinguished academic and 
manager in tourism “we are training too many 
chiefs and not enough Indians.” Lessons can be  
learnt from other disciplines such as nursing, 
where graduates are able to seek well-paid 
employment in Thailand or abroad and 
educational institutions are able to offer courses 
to a larger number of students than is feasible at 
the undergraduate or graduate level. This would 
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require establishment of training hotels within 
universities and accreditation of the programs. 
The Salaya Pavilion Hotel which is part of 
Mahidol University at Salaya is a case in point 
serving the undergraduate population whilst the 
Le Cordon Bleu culinary school of the Dusit 
Thani Hotel and The Imperial Cooking School 
of the Imperial Foods Group are two examples 
within the private sector which focus on 
vocational skills.  
11. Innovate new tourism packages such as 
the Thai Traditional Holistic Health package 
recently launched by the Rose Garden Resort at 
Sampran near Bangkok: - Other opportunities lie 
in areas of streamlining travel packages 
involving: jungle trekking; river rafting (as 
currently promoted in Malaysia); hot air 
ballooning (popular in Australia, South Africa); 
floral tours (popular in Australia, Holland, Japan, 
and in the recent past in Chiengmai via the well-
attended Royal Interflora campaign); Buddhist 
meditation tours; cross-border via self-drive an 
other options. The State Railway Authority of 
Thailand recently opened the first of several 
links to provinces not serviced by rail within 
Thailand and to neighboring countries. Vintage 
train excursions, popular in Europe, the U.S. and 
Australia, offer another untapped opportunity. 
The TAT announced plans to increase foreign 
group wedding ceremonies and tours on an 
annual basis (Sritama, (3) 2009). 
12. Revitalize the regional cruise industry: - 
Many years ago Thailand had a small locally-
owned cruise fleet, which, however, failed due 
largely to being under funded and equipped with 
old inefficient vessels. The cruise industry based 
in Florida is currently over equipped and 
operates at a loss. Local entrepreneurs ought to 
tap that industry for vessels and revitalize the 
ASEAN cruise industry to include China (where 
a cruise industry is just getting started), India – 
where 300 million people now constitute the 
middle class. Australia, New Zealand and the 
South Pacific islands which are already 
participating in an established Pacific cruise 
industry.  
No doubt other medium and short term 
tourism development solutions are feasible. 
What is patently clear though is that to overcome 
the current crisis, a bold recovery plan is 
essential and, although these could be derailed 
by any one of a number of factors, it is 
imperative to proceed. As Harold S Geneen, 
IT&T President and CEO, once put it, one must 
not after all, fall prey to “paralysis by analysis” 
(brainyquote.com). Those factors include: 
- The global economic downturn in the 
major inbound tourist destinations. 
- A rapid decline in the currencies of the 
principal source countries. This requires 
adoption of a more flexible approach in pricing 
and collecting payment for tourism products.  
- Failure to resolve the underlying issues 
dividing the country into red and yellow shirt 
sectors within society and combining them into a 
unified Thai requirement to have an elected 
(rather than an appointed) government free of 
corruption and vote buying; and the need for the 
government to contribute more effectively to the 
poorer elements in Thai society (a major 
achievement by Taksin which was largely 
funded by vote buying. However, both the One 
Product One Tambol (OTOP) and The Thirty 
Baht Medical Scheme were steps in the right 
direction. This populist approach is a glaring 
contrast by the Democrat programs which have 
historically focused on benefiting big business, 
in the belief that benefits will “trickle down” to 
the poor. If we care to look at the stimulus 
packages of many other countries in the world 
today we can see where and why such “trickle 
down” programs do not work. (Note: The term 
“Trickle Down Economics” was attributed to 
Will Rogers a movie actor and social critic 
during the great depression 1929- 1937 
(McElvaine, 1993)  
 
Conclusion  
In the last decades, Thailand has not been 
spared. The tourism sector was well on its way 
to economic recovery following the 1996 Asian 
Financial Crisis when along came the Bird Flu in 
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2004 (Abbott and Pearson, 2004) and SARS also 
in 2004 (Fouchier et al, 2004), both of which, 
though, were dealt with promptly and had little 
foothold in Thailand due to the countries innate 
skills in the Biological Sciences. Then came the 
Tsunami; a rare event indeed. But again, with the 
help of international donors and the Thai ability 
to act in a coordinated and timely way, that 
meant the crisis lasted for less than a year. This 
nevertheless does not remove the fact that an 
accurate and objective perception of crisis will 
remain tenuous unless the DETSCON scale or 
another mutually acceptable measure is accepted 
and implemented worldwide. All the more as, in 
today’s digital world of instant communication, 
news – and bad news – quickly go around the 
world, often distorted, sensationalized, or over-
reported.  An objective determination on the 
five-point DESTCON scale will go a long way 
in remedying much of these media-coverage 
issues.  It will also put travel advisories issued 
by embassies into perspective. 
While the adoption of a DESTCON scale and 
improved crisis management planning will 
contribute to mitigate damages, avoiding future 
crises, however, will also require in the case of 
Thailand a political willingness from all those 
involved to compromise and reach consensus. 
This is one of the most pressing problems facing 
the country; one which even in a contracting 
economy and a harsh business environment, 
should not be left aside. To paraphrase a speaker 
at a recent Pacific Area Travel Association 
(PATA) meeting “The problem is a Thai 
problem and will be resolved by them, in their 
own way and in their own time.” (Koldowsky, 
2009) This writer had often thought this over the 
many years he has lived in Thailand but has 
never articulated it so well.  At stake is the 
destination image of Thailand. 
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